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INTRODUCTION
As lawyers, judges and legal educators, we think of ourselves as rational
actors.1 The predominant discourse in law school and amongst lawyers is that
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I thank Kendall Kerew, Natsu
Saito, and Ryan Young for their thoughtful comments and edits on earlier drafts. I also thank
Pam Brannon and the GSU law librarians for their invaluable research assistance.
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lawyers are the ultimate rational thinkers.2 We train law students to “think like
lawyers” which presumably includes setting aside any existing biases or prejudices and thinking rationally, logically, and analytically.3
An earlier paper discusses the need to help law students understand that
“thinking like lawyers” requires that they become culturally sensible lawyers—
lawyers who understand that we all have multifaceted cultural backgrounds,
experiences, and biases that affect how we perceive and analyze legal problems
and how we interact with clients and colleagues.4 This understanding requires
students to grapple with their own biases and stereotypes,5 as well as the influence cultural factors and systemic racism have had, and continue to have, upon
the U.S. legal system.6 While racial categories are artificial constructs,7 there is
1

Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and
Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 236 (2005) (“Lawyers prefer to see themselves
as keenly rational thinkers, and negotiators as practitioners of a science with hard skills and
identifiable principles.”).
2
Graham B. Strong, The Lawyer’s Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practice of
Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 759, 761 (1998) (“Although the phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer’
may be more talismanic than descriptive, it is above all else associated with a logical, analytical style of thought.” (footnote omitted)).
3
Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, “A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason”: Toward
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (1993) (“The prevailing image
of the law is of blindfolded Justice balancing the scales of decision. Because lack of bias or
prejudice is essential to adjudication, Justice wears a blindfold to shut out persons and passions that might inappropriately influence her inward deliberation. Even where lawyers are
advocates or advisors rather than adjudicators, the profession emphasizes ‘thinking like a
lawyer.’ The phrase celebrates thought that is incisively rational, logical, analytical, and especially, dispassionate.”).
4
Andrea A. Curcio, Teresa E. Ward & Nisha Dogra, A Survey Instrument to Develop, Tailor, and Help Measure Law Student Cultural Diversity Education Learning Outcomes, 38
NOVA L. REV. 177 (2014) [hereinafter Curcio et al., Survey Instrument].
5
See infra Part II (discussing the need for students to understand their own biases and the
barriers those biases may present to effective lawyering).
6
Deborah N. Archer, There Is No Santa Claus: The Challenge of Teaching the Next Generation of Civil Rights Lawyers in a “Post-Racial” Society, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 55 (2013)
(discussing how, while students have become more aware of the need to understand the role
various cultural factors may play in the lawyering process, they have simultaneously become
more resistant to acknowledging that institutional and structural racism results in continuing
societal racial disparities—disparities students must recognize in order to provide effective
client representation); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on
the Impact and Origins of “The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection”, 40 CONN. L. REV. 931,
965–77 (2008) [hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited] (discussing how historical racial subordination continues to influence legal analysis and power structures, and
arguing that while there is value in the work done to identify the psychological mechanisms
underlying individual’s unconscious biases, that work may obscure the need to take both
moral and legal collective responsibility to affirmatively remedy the effects of, and disestablish the institutional embodiments of, white supremacy). For a discussion of the role race has
played and continues to play in the development of U.S. laws, see generally DERRICK BELL,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF
FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
On the use of equal protection theory to maintain racial subordination, see Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–54.
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a long and ongoing history of real differences in the treatment and, therefore,
collective experiences of “racial” groups.8 Those experiences influence how we
perceive and assess facts, attitudes, legal problems, and legal processes.9 Despite the different experiences resulting from people’s racial, ethnic, or cultural
backgrounds,10 there is a pervasive belief within legal education as well as
amongst the bench and bar that legal analysis involves assessing an “objective
reality,”11 and what counts as “objective” is almost always perceived through
the lens of white peoples’ experiences and privileges.12
7

See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55
(1994). On the role of law in this process, see generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. & updated ed. 2006); see also Angela P. Harris,
Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 207, 211–13
(1995) (noting that “strategic essentialism” allows racial identity to become a marker of historic wrongs and struggles for political recognition). As Professor Harris observes “ ‘race’ is
neither a natural fact simply there in ‘reality,’ nor a wrong idea, eradicable by an act of will.
‘Race’ is real, and pervasive: our very perceptions of the world . . . are filtered through a
screen of ‘race.’ ” Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994).
8
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Society of American Law Teachers,
Racial Discrimination in the Legal Profession (June 30, 2014), available at
http://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/June-30-SALT-FINAL-to-CERD-2.pdf.
9
See, e.g., MARK PEFFLY & JON HURWITZ, JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE SEPARATE REALITIES OF
BLACKS AND WHITES 28–67 (2010) (discussing survey results that demonstrate different experiences of the justice system based upon one’s race and ethnicity); Jay C. Carlisle, Synopsis of the Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in
the Courts, 19 PACE L. REV. 431 (1999) (describing how white peoples’ experiences of legal
problems, legal processes, and interactions within the justice system differed from the experiences of people of color); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Greñas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CHICANOLATINO L. REV. 1, 18–26 (1994) (discussing her experience as a Latina law student).
10
Culture is multi-faceted and all people have multiple cultural experiences and backgrounds that influence perceptions and behaviors. Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra
note 4, at 184. Moreover, one cannot assume that people from similar cultural backgrounds
have the same beliefs or perspectives. Id.; see also Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg &
Carwina Weng, Challenges of “Sameness”: Pitfalls and Benefits to Assumed Connections in
Lawyering, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 339 (2012) (discussing the need to be aware of assumptions
of “sameness”). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Essay, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 303 (1986) (discussing the United States as a
multicultural society in which cultural differences have long been regarded with distrust).
11
See Margaret Montoya & Christine Zuni Cruz, interviewed by Gene Grant, Narrative
Braids: Performing Racial Literacy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 158–61 (2009) (discussing
“objectivity” in legal education).
12
See generally Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 245 (2005). See also BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE
RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998) (discussing the prerogative of white people not
to see race) ; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) (analyzing the evolution of a perceived property interest in white racial identity); John A. Powell,
Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 419
(2000) (discussing whiteness as the “universal norm”). On the impact this has on people of
color, see generally Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Cen-

540

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:537

Two surveys of law students13 suggest that law students may believe that
legal “objectivity” and legal training in rational and analytical thinking makes
lawyers less susceptible than others, and especially less susceptible than clients,
to having, or acting upon, stereotypes or biases.14 The survey results suggest
that law students may think legal training somehow immunizes lawyers from
viewing legal problems and clients through their own cultural lenses, and from
having cultural biases that affect their analyses and interactions. And, to the extent they have biases or stereotypes, law students also believe they generally
are able to recognize those beliefs, and can identify when they are acting upon
them. Social cognition theory forces law students (and law professors, lawyers,
and judges) to confront the fallacy of those beliefs, as social cognition studies
demonstrate that stereotypes and biases affect most people’s perceptions and
interactions.15 Social cognition theory also helps explain resistance to admitting
biases—a resistance that exists at individual16 and societal levels.17
Social cognition theory helps us recognize that our legal training does not
immunize us against biases. As Professor Carwina Weng explained nearly a
decade ago, social cognition theory provides legal educators a way to help students understand the role cultural biases may play in their own interactions, as
well as in the legal process.18 Additionally, because social cognition theory is
grounded in scientific theory, explaining the psychology underlying biases may
appeal to students’ interests in developing their rational and analytical thinking
and thus make them more receptive to learning about, and confronting, their
own stereotypes and biases.
This symposium piece discusses results from two validated law student
surveys about the role culture plays in the work lawyers perform, how those results relate to social cognition theory, and what the survey results and social
cognition theory suggest for legal educators, lawyers and judges in terms of
improving our abilities to work effectively across cultures. While much of this
article talks about educating students, the principles and theories discussed often apply equally to educating ourselves.
trifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 263 (2000).
13
The initial survey is discussed in Andrea A. Curcio, Teresa M. Ward & Nisha Dogra, Educating Culturally Sensible Lawyers: A Study of Student Attitudes About the Role Culture
Plays in the Lawyering Process, 16 UNIV. W. SYDNEY L. REV. 98 (2012) [hereinafter Curcio
et al., Student Attitudes]. The second survey is discussed in Curcio et al., Survey Instrument,
supra note 4.
14
See infra Tables 1, 2, 5.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Parts II, III.
17
Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6, at 931 (discussing how the focus
on individual’s unconscious racism may obscure the bigger issue: that racism is a societal
problem that should be addressed via collective responsibility and action).
18
Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural SelfAwareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005) (discussing why exposure to social cognition
theory could help develop students’ abilities to work effectively across cultures).
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Part I discusses the survey results which indicate law students believe that
they, and lawyers generally, are less likely than others to view the law and legal
problems through a culturally biased lens. It also sets out survey data that suggest law students believe they are fairly adept at identifying when stereotypes
or biases potentially affect their conduct or analysis. Part II explores the social
cognition theory literature that suggests self-reports of bias are inaccurate because of the power of implicit (hidden) biases that operate on a largely unconscious level, and explains how the survey results are consistent with that literature. It also provides an overview of some studies that demonstrate how
implicit bias may affect the lawyering process, to illustrate why it is critical that
lawyers understand the cultural lenses and biases through which we all operate.
Part III reviews social cognition theory as it relates to understanding our resistance to admitting that we have, and act upon, biases. Part IV discusses how
legal educators may use social cognition theory as the cornerstone of a program
of legal education that recognizes the need to infuse the curriculum with an
awareness of the role culture plays in the lawyering process.
I.

SURVEY RESULTS

To help legal educators “assess the need for cultural competence education
and to inform the discussion of what that education might encompass,”19 we20
developed a “cultural sensibility survey” instrument. This development occurred in two phases. An initial instrument, administered to 125 incoming law
students and 13 upper level clinic students, used a five-point semantic differential response scale21 (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree), and it contained a series of open-ended questions.22 That initial survey instrument (“Survey 1”) reached a sufficient level of sample adequacy (Kaiser-Meyer Olkin
Measure = .713).23 However, based upon student feedback in the open-ended
questions, we believed the instrument could be improved. Using that feedback,
as well as feedback from focus groups and expert reviews, we developed a second instrument that was administered to 591 incoming and upper level students
at two different schools (“Survey 2”). That instrument used a six-point seman-

19

Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at 98.
The survey development work was done in collaboration with Dr. Teresa M. Ward and
Dr. Nisha Dogra.
21
A semantic differential response scale measures people’s reactions to words or concepts
using a scale with opposing adjectives or descriptors, such as agree/disagree, on either end of
the scale. DAVID R. HEISE, The Semantic Differential and Attitude Research, in ATTITUDE
MEASUREMENT 235 (Gene F. Summers ed., 1970).
22
Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at 107.
23
Id. at 108. For a detailed description of the statistical analysis, see id. at 110–11.
20
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tic differential response scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree),24
and had a reliability alpha of .842.25
In both surveys, law students were asked questions that sought information
about whether they believed that they held culturally biased views that affected
their perceptions and interactions. This article looks specifically at certain questions or subsets of questions from both surveys.26 The survey results set forth
below lay the foundation for the discussion of the interplay between social cognition theory and developing future lawyers’ understanding that, despite being
trained in rational thinking, they are still likely to be subject to unconscious biases that influence their perceptions and conduct.
As the data in Table 1 illustrate, 589 law student respondents thought lawyers are less likely than clients, and somewhat less likely than judges, to look at
legal problems through their own cultural lens. Students were even less likely
to think that they, personally, viewed the legal system through a culturally biased lens.
TABLE 1: WHO LOOKS AT LEGAL PROBLEMS THROUGH A CULTURAL LENS27
Mean28

Survey Items
Clients look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.

SD

5.09

0.97

Judges do not look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.

4.65

1.23

Lawyers look at legal problems through their own cultural lens.

4.01

1.29

3.86

1.37

29

I do not view the legal system through a culturally biased lens.

30

As shown in Table 2, students also believed there was a difference in how
likely one’s cultural background was to influence lawyer/client communica24

The six-point differential scale was to control for a perceived neutral mid-point. Curcio et
al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at 210 (there were no descriptive terms beyond
1 = strongly disagree and 6 = strongly agree).
25
Id. at 211. For a more detailed breakdown of the statistical analysis performed, see id. at
211–14.
26
In Survey 2, we compared responses between upper level and incoming students; students
from the two different schools participating in the survey; white and non-white students, and
men and women. Id. at 236–47, apps. B–E. While the mean score answers to most items
were generally identical as between all sub-divided cohorts, occasionally there was a 0.01
difference in the mean for a particular item. See id. The tables here present data as divided
between the two schools. See id. at app. C at 239–41.
27
Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 236–37.
28
1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 588–590.
29
Reverse coded. When questions are written in the negative, in order to correlate answers
with questions that are written in the positive, the answers to the question worded in the negative are “reverse coded”—i.e. a response of “1” [strongly disagree] is coded as if it was a
“6” [strongly agree]; a 2 is coded as if it was a 5, etc. For a more detailed explanation of
why and how to reverse code survey items, see Karen Grace-Martin, An Easy Way to
Reverse Code Scale Items, THE ANALYSIS FACTOR, http://www.theanalysisfactor.com
/easy-reverse-code/ (last visited May 3, 2015).
30
Reverse coded. See supra note 29.
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tions. While students recognized that communication within the lawyer/client
relationship was influenced by both the lawyer’s and the client’s cultural backgrounds, students found it more likely that the client’s communications were
influenced by their cultural backgrounds.
TABLE 2: IMPACT OF CULTURE ON LAWYER/CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS31
Survey Items

Mean32

How a client communicates with his or her lawyer is not influenced by
the client’s cultural background.33

5.19

1.04

How a lawyer communicates with his or her client is not influenced by
the lawyer’s cultural background.34

4.67

0.99

SD

When asked if lawyers brought culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship, students, on average, tended to think they did not.
TABLE 3: BRINGING CULTURALLY BIASED ASSUMPTIONS
35
INTO THE LAWYER/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Survey Items

Mean36

Lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer-client relationship.

3.42

1.34

White lawyers bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship.

3.57

1.50

SD

We also asked students about themselves. As Table 4 indicates, students
believed, on average, that they could recognize when they were reacting based
upon culturally biased assumptions and stereotypes.
TABLE 4: ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE OWN BIASES37
Survey Items

Mean38

In general, I can accurately identify my culturally biased assumptions
about others who are from cultures different from my own.

4.20

1.04

In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are
based on stereotypical beliefs.

4.61

0.91

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 236–37.
1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 589–590.
Reverse coded. See supra note 29.
Reverse coded. See supra note 29.
Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 238.
1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 589–590.
Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. C at 237–38.
1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree. n = 587.

SD
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Finally, in the initial survey, students were asked about their own abilities
to identify when they were acting based upon culturally biased assumptions and
stereotypical beliefs and about others’ abilities to do so. Students felt fairly
confident that they could identify when they were acting based upon stereotypes or culturally biased assumptions. Using a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree), in response to the statement: “In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are based on stereotypical beliefs,” approximately 5 percent of the 137 respondents selected numbers 1 or 2 while 73 percent chose either number 4 or 5.39 In response to the statement, “In general, I
can accurately identify my culturally biased assumptions about others who are
from different racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds,” no students chose number 1
(strongly disagree) and only 3.7 percent of the respondents selected the number
2, while 64 percent chose number 4 and 8 percent selected number 5.40 Students not only felt that they could generally identify when their reactions were
based on stereotypical beliefs or culturally biased assumptions, they also felt
they were much better than others when it comes to recognizing when biases
and stereotypes affected their conduct or judgment.
TABLE 5: SELF V. OTHERS41
Survey Items

Mean42

Most people are unable to recognize when their reactions to other
people are based on stereotypical beliefs

3.22

0.92

In general, I am able to recognize when my reactions to others are
based on stereotypical beliefs

3.83

0.80

Most people cannot accurately identify their culturally biased assumptions about others who are from different racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds

3.09

0.87

In general, I can accurately identify my culturally-biased assumptions
about others who are from different racial/ethnic/cultural backgrounds

3.76

0.65

SD

The survey results set forth above are consistent with studies that suggest
that people have a “bias blind spot” (we can see bias in others but not ourselves).43 While it is not surprising that law students have the same “bias blind
spot” as others, what has not previously been identified is that this “bias blind
spot” extends to law students’ views about lawyers versus clients.44 It is unclear
39

Curcio et al., Student Attitudes, supra note 13, at app. B at 126, tbl.2.
Id.
41
Id. These questions were asked only in Survey 1. The comparison of self to other questions were eliminated from Survey 2 both because we wanted Survey 2 to focus on students’
self-assessments rather than comparisons, and because we wanted to keep Survey 2 as short
as possible.
42
1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. n = 136–138.
43
See infra Part III.A (discussing bias blind spot).
44
See supra Tables 1, 2.
40
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whether the reason students think lawyers are less likely than their clients to be
influenced by their cultural backgrounds is because students see themselves as
future lawyers and thus the results are simply an extension of the “bias blind
spot,” or if students believe that legal training enables lawyers to better monitor
and control for biases and stereotypes. In either case, the survey results suggest
that law students would benefit from exposure to social cognition theory45 to
help understand how deeply rooted our biases are, and to dispel the belief that
legal training in rational and “objective” thinking trumps lifelong cognitive
processes.
II. SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY AND THE FALLIBILITY OF OBJECTIVITY
Social cognition theory tells us that we all have stereotypes, biases, and
prejudices that affect our perceptions and interactions.46 Inundated with stimuli
and information, our brains use heuristics (mental shortcuts) and schema
(groupings of information) to process information efficiently.47 Stereotypes are
cognitive schema in which we group people based upon our experiences as well
as information from friends, family, neighborhoods, the media, etc.48 At its
core, a stereotype “is a faulty generalization about a group or its members.”49
Biases and prejudices are generally defined as attitudes based upon applying
stereotypes to individuals or social groups,50 and the terms are often used inter-

45

Others have suggested exposing law students to social cognition theory to help them better understand issues that may arise in cross-cultural lawyer/client communications. See, e.g.,
Lawrence M. Solan, Four Reasons to Teach Psychology to Legal Writing Students, 22 J.L. &
POL’Y 7 (2013); Weng, supra note 18, at 391. The survey results set forth in this article provide hard evidence of the need to do so.
46
Michelle R. Gomez, The Next Generation of Disparate Treatment: A Merger of Law and
Social Science, 32 REV. LITIG. 553, 568–69 (2013).
47
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 555–56 (2002).
48
Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The Use of Narrative to Neutralize
Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 324 (2012).
49
Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation
in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1908 (2009).
50
See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave,
57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 829 (2001) [hereinafter Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice] (defining
prejudice as “an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a
member of that group”); Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 384 (2008) (adopting Dovidio’s
definition); see also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 742 (1995) (noting that prejudice
“consists of derogatory personal beliefs”). But see Bartlett, supra note 49 (noting that social
scientists describe biases and prejudices as “positive or negative attitude that can attach to a
stereotype”) (emphasis added). Cognitive bias has been described as, “the use of categories
that are themselves shaped or contaminated by confining stereotypes and habitual ways of
thinking about nondominant groups in our society.” Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of
Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 467 (1998).
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changeably.51 The reason we may be unaware of our stereotypes, biases, and
prejudices is because they become embedded in our subconscious from an early
age.
A. Stereotypes and Bias: The Early Beginnings
Stereotype schemas begin at a very young age as infants and toddlers begin
to categorize people based upon easily observable characteristics such as skin
color, gender, age, etc.52 Professor Jody Armour describes stereotypes as the
“well-learned sets of associations among groups and traits established in children’s memories at an early age, before they have the cognitive skills to decide
rationally upon the personal acceptability of the stereotypes.”53 For example,
studies show that racial stereotypes are in place before children enter kindergarten.54 Stereotypes become so internalized that simply seeing someone from a
particular social group can prime and activate stereotypes for that group.55
Rozas and Miller discuss a model, the “cycle of socialization,” that explains
how “people enter a world in which their social identity (race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) influences what they are taught, how they

51

As Professor Mahzarin Banaji, one of the principle investigators of implicit bias theory,
notes, the terms “bias” and “prejudice” are often used interchangeably. See Transcript of
Motion: Evidentiary Hearing at 477, New Hampshire v. Addison, No. 07-S-0254, 2008 WL
2675622 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2008); see also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 1359, 1360 n.8 (noting that “bias” and “prejudice” are used interchangeably). The terms
also are often used in conjunction with each other. A February 2015 Westlaw search of secondary sources resulted in over eight thousand articles using the phrase “bias or prejudice”.
This article follows the convention of using the terms bias and prejudice interchangeably and
in conjunction with each other.
52
Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1999) (noting that “[e]vidence suggests that race, gender, age, and other characteristics are among the
first perceived and associated with specific encounters”).
53
Armour, supra note 50, at 741.
54
Leland Ware, “Color Struck”: Intragroup and Cross-Racial Color Discrimination, 13
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 75, 107–08 (2013) (discussing studies of children ages three to five connecting positive adjectives to white faces and negative adjectives to black faces). In an oftcited 1947 study, researchers found that in the United States, children learn as early as age
three to devalue people with dark skin color. Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial
Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169
(Theodore M. Newcomb & Eugene L. Hartley eds., 1947) (presenting young African American children with light skinned and dark skinned dolls and finding the children preferred the
white-colored dolls). A recent preliminary study suggests that this preference for lighter skin
remains present in children today. See Study: White and Black Children Biased Toward
Lighter Skin, CNN (May 14, 2010, 4:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/13/doll.study/.
55
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 798–800 (2012) (describing studies
showing how quickly stereotypes, especially racial stereotypes, can be primed and activated).
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are treated, and to what information and opportunities they are exposed.”56
They note that those in whom children place their trust (parents, teachers, family, friends) normalize stereotypes, biases, prejudices, and understandings of the
world based upon cultural identities.57 Through this social acculturation, racism58 and other forms of social oppression become embedded into both the individual and collective unconscious.59
B. Repression and Aversive Racism
While most people, or at least most law students, presumably recognize
that acting based upon biases and stereotypes is socially unacceptable,60 not to
mention often illegal,61 that does not mean it doesn’t happen. What does happen is that people tend to either repress or deny the existence of stereotypical
thoughts or behaviors,62 and thus think that they are not acting upon them.
People have biases that may relate to race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, age, disability, etc., many of which exist on a subconscious level.63 Presumably, most law students would like to think of themselves as low
56
Lisa Werkmeister Rozas & Joshua Miller, Discourses for Social Justice Education: The
Web of Racism and the Web of Resistance, 18 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN SOCIAL
WORK 24, 29 (2009).
57
Id.
58
Racism is different than individual prejudices. Professor John F. Dovidio notes that racism “involves a widely accepted racist ideology and the power to deny other racial groups
the ‘dignity, opportunities, freedoms, and rewards’ that are available to one’s own group
through ‘a socially organized set of ideas, attitudes, and practices.’ ” Dovidio, Contemporary
Prejudice, supra note 50 (quoting JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNÁN VEGA, WHITE RACISM: THE
BASICS (1995)).
59
Rozas & Miller, supra note 56.
60
Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1359, 1386 (2008) (noting that “even highly prejudiced people usually know that open displays of bias are considered unacceptable”). While there is a social stigma attached to openly
endorsing negative stereotypes, that same stigma does not necessarily exist for positive stereotypes even though positive stereotypes may be as harmful as their negative counterparts.
See Aaron C. Kay et al., The Insidious (and Ironic) Effects of Positive Stereotypes, 49 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (2013) (discussing why positive stereotypes are harmful).
61
Demonstrating an employer acted based upon stereotypes can help establish a violation of
Title VII’s prohibition against unlawful employment actions. For a discussion of the role stereotypes play in plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claims, see Kerry Lynn Stone, Clarifying
Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591 (2011) (discussing the development and application of
evidence of stereotyping as evidence of unlawful employment practices).
62
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987) (noting that as our culture has rejected racism as immoral and unproductive, people feel compelled to hide their prejudices). This repression of biases and prejudices by well-meaning people, and especially white people, lays
at the heart of studies on aversive racism. See, e.g., Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra
note 50, at 833–35 (describing studies that indicate how people who endorse egalitarian
views do not discriminate directly but often do so unconsciously, especially when their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race).
63
The existence of these subconscious biases have been confirmed by Implicit Association
Tests (“IAT”). For a discussion of implicit association tests, see infra Part II.C. For a discussion of some of the biases measured by IATs, see, e.g., Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Re-
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prejudiced people (i.e., people who do not endorse or accept the content of negative racial or other cultural stereotypes).64 While the survey did not ask questions that would indicate whether students endorsed negative cultural stereotypes, it did ask students if they could identify when they were acting based
upon stereotypes and culturally biased assumptions, and whether they believed
that they looked at the legal system through a culturally biased lens.65 Their responses indicate that many law students believe they are cognizant of their biases, and that they are less likely than other people, and particularly less likely
than clients, to look at legal problems through a culturally biased lens.66 What
students may not recognize is that stereotypes and biases operate on a subconscious basis. Because we live in a society in which racial, gender, religious, and
other biases are woven into the fabric of our culture, “consciously biased people (‘high-prejudiced people’) and those who espouse more egalitarian views
(‘low-prejudiced people’) demonstrate equal activation of societal stereotypes
under conditions when no time exists for personal beliefs to interfere with the
unconscious automatic response.”67
One of the most studied subconscious biases relates to race.68 Looking at
racial biases between whites and blacks, Professors Gaertner and Dovidio
coined the term “aversive racists” to describe white people who consciously
endorse egalitarian views yet have negative racial feelings and beliefs (often
formed through their socialization processes).69 Aversive racists are either unvisited, supra note 6, at 957 (noting that an analysis of tens of thousands of implicit association tests “found that eighty-eight percent of white people had a pro-white or anti-black implicit bias; nearly eighty-three percent of heterosexuals showed implicit bias for straight
people over gays and lesbians; and more than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim testers
displayed implicit biases against Arab Muslims”); see also Mark Deal, Aversive Disablism:
Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People, 22 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 93 (2007) (discussing
implicit biases against disabled people); Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit
Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1
(2010) (discussing the development of implicit association tests to measure gender bias in
the legal profession).
64
Armour, supra note 50.
65
Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. A.
66
See supra Tables 1, 2, 4, 5.
67
Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 919 (1999)
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (1989)). The automatic activation of
stereotypes when decision making occurs quickly is also discussed by Professor Dovidio in
his work on aversive racism. See Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 840.
68
See, e.g., Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, 840–45 (discussing various
studies testing the relationship between unconscious racial biases and people’s behaviors);
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 353–63 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality] (discussing numerous and wide-ranging studies identifying and discussing implicit racial
biases).
69
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 835. Aversive racists are distinguished from those who openly express bigoted views—those people are coined “oldfashioned, or dominative racists”. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding
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aware of their negative racial beliefs or deny their existence because those beliefs are incompatible with their egalitarian self-images.70 Aversive racists will
not discriminate overtly, but “will discriminate, often unintentionally, when
their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race (e.g.,
questionable qualifications for a position).”71 The studies on aversive racism
indicated a significant difference in results between people’s self-reports about
bias and prejudice, and patterns of (often unconscious) subtle discrimination.72
Aversive racism theories were built upon observations of people’s conduct, as
compared to their self-reports about prejudice.73 As discussed in the next section, eventually these observations were confirmed via computer technology.
C. Implicit Association Tests Confirm the Existence of Unconscious Biases
Because the desire to answer in a socially acceptable manner combined
with the subconscious operation of biases result in unreliable self-reports, cognitive and social psychologists developed numerous tests of bias that rely on
physiological indicators, rather than self-reports.74 One of the most widely
known and validated75 of these is the implicit association test (“IAT”). Developed over twenty years ago by Professors Greenwald and Banaji,76 this test indicates a significant portion of Americans have biases based upon a wide range
of cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, and sexual ori-

and Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup
Identity Model, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 623 (2005).
70
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 835.
71
Id. An example of how aversive racism manifests can be found in a 1998 study by Professors Dovidio and Gaertner. In that study, employers were presented with candidates with
identical credentials. When candidates were equally qualified or unqualified, there was little
difference in which candidate was recommended for the job. However, when qualifications
were more ambiguous, white study participants recommended the black candidate significantly less often. The authors suggest this finding indicates that white participants tended to
give white, but not black, job candidates the “benefit of the doubt.” Id. at 836–38.
72
Id. at 838; see also Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817 (2004) (discussing findings that people try to mask biased decision making in employment and admissions decisions by engaging in casuistry—
i.e. they find an unbiased justification for a biased decision, such as inflating their preferred
candidates’ qualifications over those of competitors).
73
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 834–45 (discussing studies that
demonstrate the existence of aversive racism amongst those who self-reported egalitarian
attitudes).
74
Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law,
58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (2010) (citing to a wide range of physiological tests that have
been developed to assess bias).
75
Id. at 488–89 (discussing IAT validity studies); see also Anthony G. Greenwald, Implicit
Association Test: Validity Debates, http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm (last
visited May 3, 2015) (listing links to numerous IAT validity studies).
76
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, SelfEsteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
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entation.77 The test operates upon the premise that it takes slightly longer for an
unconsciously biased person to connect positive descriptive words with a
member of a disfavored group.78 Not only does the test uncover unconscious or
hidden biases (implicit biases), it also demonstrates that implicit bias differs
from explicitly expressed attitudes. “Even those who consciously renounce
prejudice have been shown to have implicit or automatic biases that conflict
with their nonprejudiced values . . . .”79
Well-meaning white people are not the only people who harbor unconscious biases. In our survey, nonwhite students thought white lawyers were
more likely than lawyers belonging to racial and ethnic minorities to bring culturally biased assumptions into the lawyer/client relationship.80 Results from
the IAT test suggest that while that may be true, membership in a group that is
subjected to biases and stereotypes does not protect one against subconscious
endorsement of those stereotypes. For example, the IAT race test found that 88
percent of those self-identifying as white had a pro-white bias while 48 percent
of those self-identifying as black showed a pro-white or anti-black bias.81 The
IAT tests also found that women, as well as men, displayed implicit gender stereotypes.82 The IAT provides evidence that biases are pervasive and may affect
even those harmed by the biases.
D. Implicit Bias, Confirmation Bias, and Lawyering
1. Implicit Bias
While the IAT tests do not claim that those with implicit biases consistently act upon them, there is substantial evidence that racial and ethnic stereotypes
and biases affect our perceptions, interactions, and behaviors, often without our
awareness.83 For example, studies indicate that our biases may affect our eye
77

For
a
list
of
the
available
IAT
tests,
see
PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html (last visited June 4, 2015).
78
Pollard, supra note 67, at 918. For a detailed and yet easily comprehensible explanation
of how the test works, see MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT:
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 32–52 (2013) [hereinafter BANAJI & GREENWALD,
BLINDSPOT].
79
Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 757 (2001); see
also Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 840 (noting that implicit attitudes
predict nonverbal behaviors while explicit attitudes predict verbal or deliberative and controlled actions).
80
Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. D at 243.
81
Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6, at 957 (noting that “victims of
white supremacy often internalize racial bias directed against them”).
82
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 68, at 361 (discussing findings that
group membership does not insulate one from bias about that group, such as studies finding
both women and men displayed implicit gender stereotypes; and both young and old people
have a preference for young over old).
83
BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 46–52 (discussing studies showing
correlations between implicit biases and racially discriminatory behaviors).
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contact, seating distance, and how frequently we smile when interviewing clients and witnesses.84 Thus, our biases can affect our lawyer/client relationships,
and our relationships with colleagues and judges, even when we are unaware
that they are doing so.85 Because implicit biases manifest via nonverbal cues,
those that are the target of the biases are aware that the person with whom they
are interacting has biases, even if the person believes he or she is acting in a bias-free manner.86 This difference in perception can have a negative impact on
interactions, can interfere with the ability to work effectively together,87 and
can perpetuate inequalities.88 For example, in a study of teamwork effectiveness amongst college students, interracial teams with aversive racists were the
least efficient—even less efficient than those with self-identified prejudiced
white team members.89 To the extent implicit racial attitudes are manifested
through nonverbal behavior and detected by people of color, those unconscious
biases can affect the group dynamic and impede the group’s overall performance.90
Studies also show that it does not take much to “prime” stereotypes and,
once activated, these stereotypes can play a role in decision making. For example, when study participants listened to rap music, they rated a black person’s
behavior as less intelligent and more hostile than when they listened to pop music.91 Changing the skin tone of a perpetrator in a security camera photo affected the way people judged ambiguous trial evidence.92 Implicit bias can even
84

Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1171 (2008)
(noting that “studies have shown that white people high in implicit bias toward blacks smiled
less frequently, created greater physical distance, and displayed stiffness with their body language during interactions with a black person, and spent less time conversing, as compared
to interactions with a white person”).
85
For a discussion of how implicit biases affect lawyer hiring and promotion decisions and
legal workplace dynamics, see Professor Negowetti’s thoughtful article in this symposium
issue. Nicole E. Negowetti, Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession’s “Diversity Crisis”: A
Call for Self-Reflection, 15 NEV. L.J. 930 (2015).
86
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 842–43.
87
Id. at 845.
88
Id.; see also Negowetti, supra note 85, at 942–45 (discussing the negative impact implicit
biases can have on law firm work assignments and the other workplace opportunities available to women and people of color as compared to their male or white counterparts).
89
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 844–45. These attitudes can also
negatively impact job performance. Professor Dovidio concludes:
To the extent that Blacks are in the minority in an organization and are dependent on highly
prejudiced Whites or aversive racists on work-related tasks, their performance is likely to be objectively poorer than the performance of Whites who predominantly interact with other Whites.
Thus, even when Whites harbor unconscious and unintentional biases toward Blacks, their actions can have effects, sometimes even more detrimental than those of old-fashioned racists, on
the outcomes and ultimately on the wellbeing of Blacks.

Id. at 845.
90
Dovidio, Contemporary Prejudice, supra note 50, at 844.
91
Smith & Levinson, supra note 55, at 799 (describing a study in which participants believed they were participating in a marketing study and were asked to listen to music for thirteen minutes).
92
Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 331–39 (2010)
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affect how one remembers facts. One study indicates that changing the race of
an assailant in an assault case resulted in jurors misremembering facts in racially biased ways.93
Legal training in rational and analytical thinking does not immunize one
from having and acting upon biases. A study found implicitly biased racial attitudes amongst capital defense lawyers—lawyers one might assume would be
least likely to harbor biases and racialized attitudes.94 Nor is the judiciary immune from implicit biases.95 One study demonstrates that judges, like everyone
else, have implicit biases that affect their perceptions and decision making.96
During a judicial education conference, Professor Rachlinski and colleagues
recruited 133 judges from three jurisdictions to participate in a study.97 The
judges took the IAT race bias test and also analyzed three different fact scenarios to answer questions about conviction, sentencing, and likelihood of recidivism.98 The IAT test results indicated that the judges, like others, harbor implicit racial biases.99 The response to questions about the various factual
scenarios also indicated that lack of awareness of the biases may affect the judicial decision-making processes and judgments.100
2. Confirmation Bias
Implicit bias is only one of the biases that operate subconsciously.101 Another powerful subconscious bias, and one that has implications for lawyers and
law practice, is confirmation bias. Confirmation bias has been defined as “the
tendency to seek out evidence consistent with one’s views, and to ignore, dis(finding that participants evaluated evidence differently based upon the skin tone of the perpetrator).
93
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 68, at 390–406 (discussing findings that
mock jurors more accurately remember facts supporting the defendant’s aggressive behavior
when the defendant is black than when the defendant is white).
94
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty
Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004).
95
See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2010) (discussing one judge’s dismay at discovering he harbored implicit biases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (discussing a study in which
a significant percentage of white judges demonstrated a white preference on the IAT).
96
Rachlinski et al., supra note 95, at 1197.
97
Id. at 1205.
98
Id. at 1214–19.
99
Id. at 1221.
100
Interestingly, the study suggested that when made aware of biases and motivated to control for them, judges were able to do so. Id.
101
A discussion of the numerous biases that may affect perception and judgment is outside
the scope of this article. For a discussion of the various biases that give rise to “bias blind
spot,” see generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2006) [hereinafter Pronin, Perception and Misperception].
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miss, or selectively reinterpret evidence that contradicts them.”102 Confirmation
bias explains how our unconscious perceptions affect our evaluations of people
and evidence.103
A recent study illustrates how confirmation bias may come into play in the
legal workplace.104 Five partners from different law firms deliberately inserted
grammatical, factual and analytical errors in a legal research memo about trade
secrets in internet start-ups.105 The memo then was analyzed by fifty-three different law firm partners who agreed to participate in a study on “writing competencies of young attorneys.”106 The partners were asked to edit the memo for
all factual, technical, and substantive errors and to rate the memo’s overall
quality.107 The partners received the same memo, with a cover page indicating
the memo was drafted by a male third-year associate who graduated from NYU
Law School. Half were told the associate was “Caucasian,” and the other half
were told the associate was “African American.”108
The identical memo averaged statistically significant lower overall ratings
for the African American associate (3.2/5.0) versus the Caucasian associate
(4.1/5.0).109 More errors were found in the memo written by the African American associate,110 and the qualitative comments were more negative for the African American “writer.”111 Based upon these data, the study authors concluded
that confirmation bias played a role in the study results. They noted that
“[w]hen expecting to find more errors, we find more errors.”112 The combination of unconscious biases about writing abilities of African American lawyers
and confirmation bias produced an “objective” evaluation that scored an African American associate much more poorly than his Caucasian counterpart for
exactly the same work product.113
A similar finding—that implicit bias and confirmation bias were at play in
associates’ evaluations—was seen in another study the same authors conducted.
In one law firm, minority summer associates were consistently being evaluated
102

Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 390, 391
(2009).
103
See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (explaining confirmation bias and how it
manifests).
104
ARIN N. REEVES, NEXTIONS, YELLOW PAPER SERIES 2014-0404, WRITTEN IN BLACK
& WHITE: EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING
SKILLS, NEXTIONS (2014), available at http://www.nextions.com/wp-content/files_mf
/14151940752014040114WritteninBlackandWhiteYPS.pdf
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
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more negatively than their majority counterparts. To test whether those evaluations were accurate, the firm developed a blind grading system for a couple of
assignments.114 Comparing the “blindly graded” assignments to the summer associates’ other assessments, the law firm found that the blind evaluations were
generally more positive for minorities and women than their other assessments.
The opposite was true for white men—their blindly graded assessments were
generally less positive than their other assessments.115 These studies provide
additional evidence that unconscious biases affect how lawyers “objectively”
evaluate evidence and performance.116
III. SELF-AWARENESS, SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY, AND
RESISTANCE TO MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION
A. Bias Blind Spot and Multicultural Education
Social cognition theory teaches us that not only do most people have unconscious biases, they also have a “bias blind spot” (i.e. people tend to believe
that while others are relatively susceptible to bias, they are relatively biasfree).117 People over-estimate their ability to control their judgments and feelings,118 and even when they know they are using biased processes to make decisions, they believe their decisions are “objective” and untainted by bias.119

114

Id.
Id.
116
As Professor Negowetti aptly points out, failure to recognize the impact of implicit bias
on legal workplace dynamics and evaluations may be one reason for the persistent lack of
diversity seen in major law firms across the country. Negowetti, supra note 85, at 934–35
(discussing lack of diversity at large law firms); id. at 945–49 (discussing the role implicit
bias may play in law firm evaluations of associates’ performance).
117
Pronin, Perception and Misperception, supra note 101, at 37–38 (discussing the wide
range of biases and people’s tendencies to believe others have biases while they are immune
to them); Emily Pronin & Kathleen Schmidt, Claims and Denials of Bias and Their Implications for Policy, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 195, 196–97 (Eldar Shafir ed.,
2013) (listing the various research that supports evidence of bias blind spot in various cognitive and motivational biases); Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 680 (2005) (discussing how people generally have a bias “blind spot” when it comes
to identifying their own biases and discussing studies which demonstrate that people are less
likely to think they are guilty of bias in a specific instance than in the abstract, and that people tend to believe that their personal connection to an issue makes them less likely to be biased but that others’ personal connections makes them more likely to be biased). See generally BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78.
118
Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 125–26
(1994) (discussing how their studies suggest that people underestimate their own susceptibility to bias and overestimate their ability to control their own thoughts and feelings).
119
See generally Katherine Hansen et al., People Claim Objectivity After Knowingly Using
Biased Strategies, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (2014).
115
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Like the students in our survey,120 people also tend to think they are better
than others when it comes to recognizing when they are acting based upon biases and stereotypes.121 In answering the question “why do people tend to see
bias in others while being blind to it in themselves,” Emily Pronin and Mathew
Kugler attribute this tendency, at least in part, to what they call the “introspection illusion.”122 They found that when judging bias, people tended to judge
others’ biases by looking at others’ behavior, but to judge their own biases by
looking introspectively at their own thoughts and feelings.123 People tend to be
unaware of the limitations of their own introspections, thus they over-value
their ability to accurately assess when they are acting based upon biases (i.e.
they are unaware that bias generally manifests unconsciously and thus, introspection does not yield evidence of bias).124 One way that researchers have
found to counteract this “bias blind spot” is to provide students with studies
about: 1) subconscious influences on attitudes and behaviors; 2) the failure of
introspection to access what occurs in our minds on an unconscious level; and
3) people’s lack of awareness regarding when they have been unintentionally
influenced.125 This exposure reduces students’ susceptibility to bias blind spot
(i.e. after reading an article about these studies, students were less likely to
“claim objectivity” in their own judgments while “imputing bias” to others).126
This finding has implications for legal educators who encourage selfreflection as a methodology that helps students develop their cultural sensibility
skills.127 To the extent law students fall prey to “introspection illusion,” their
120

See supra Table 5.
See generally Ehrlinger et al., supra note 117; Pronin, Perception and Misperception,
supra note 101; Emily Pronin, How We See Ourselves and How We See Others, 320 SCIENCE
1177 (2008); Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,
28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., 369 (2002).
122
Emily Pronin and Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565,
566 (2007).
123
Id. at 570.
124
Id. at 571.
125
Id. at 574–75.
126
Id. at 575.
127
Many advocate self-reflection as a key component of multicultural education. See, e.g.,
Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 64–78 (2001) (discussing the need for law students to engage in selfreflection and explaining how self-reflection plays a part in various aspects of developing
“habits” that lead to effective intercultural lawyering); Antoinette Sedillo López, Making and
Breaking Habits: Teaching (and Learning) Cultural Context, Self-Awareness, and Intercultural Communication Through Case Supervision in a Client-Service Legal Clinic, 28 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 47 (2008) (arguing for the need to develop students’ self-awareness
about the role their own cultural perspectives play in lawyer/client interactions); see also
Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along: Interpersonal Biases & Interracial Distrust, 8
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 100 (2002) (suggesting that overcoming ingrained racial attitudes requires actively engaging in self-reflection); Paul R.
Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL
L. REV. 373, 410–11 (2002) (discussing how social workers and counselors are taught about
the need for self-reflection as a skill necessary for intercultural counseling).
121
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self-reflection without exposure to social cognition theory literature may actually be counter-productive. It may simply entrench students’ belief that they are
“objective”128 while others are biased. It appears that for introspection to make
inroads into students’ awareness of their biases, that introspection should be
preceded with exposure to social cognition theory, including studies and literature about the existence of bias blind spot and the reasons it exists.
B. Self-Awareness, Resistance, and Multicultural Education
Exposure to social cognition theory about subconscious biases can help destigmatize bias and encourage students to explore their own biases and the impact those have upon the lawyering process.129 It provides students with a neurological explanation for why legal analytical training is unlikely to trump a
lifetime of subconscious cognitive processes. It also potentially addresses one
reason law students might resist learning about the role culture plays in the
lawyering process: their belief that they already recognize when they have, and
are acting upon, stereotypical or culturally biased beliefs.130 Students may see
no reason to learn about something they think they already understand,131 especially if they believe that their training in analytical “objective” analyses makes
them less susceptible to operating from biases or stereotypes.132 Learning about
social cognition theories such as implicit bias, aversive racism, confirmation
bias, and bias blind spot may help eliminate resistance based upon students’ beliefs that they already have a solid grasp on how their own biases affect them.
On the other hand, teaching students about the pervasiveness of unconscious biases, even amongst well-meaning people, presents some risks. For example, too much focus on the socialization that underlies the development of
individuals’ subconscious cognitive biases may lead students to focus on bias
128
Belief in one’s own objectivity is itself problematic. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias
in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012) (discussing study by Uhlmann and
Cohen that demonstrates that when subjects were primed to feel objective, they were more
likely to show gender-based discrimination when making a hypothetical hiring decision).
129
Understanding the neurological processing that underlies subconscious biases and stereotypes, and learning that even well-meaning people are not immune to that processing, can
help de-stigmatize bias which, in turn, can lead to a willingness to admit to one’s own biases.
Without recognition that bias exists, one cannot work to counter-act it. Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1529 (2005) (noting that “to counter otherwise
automatic behavior, one must accept the existence of the problem in the first place.”).
130
See supra Tables 4, 5.
131
Bryant, supra note 127, at 80 (noting that students may believe cross-cultural education
is unnecessary for “progressive well-meaning” people). This attitude may carry over into the
workplace and lead to a resistance to recognizing the need to address racial disparity within
the legal workplace. See Negowetti, supra note 85, at 953–54 (noting that, without education
about the existence and impact of implicit biases, many white lawyers may resist, or at least
fail to support, corrective actions designed to create more diverse legal workplaces).
132
Bryant, supra note 127, at 61 (“Resistance occurs when students fail to see the relevance
of cross-cultural instruction or ascribe greater value to learning other skills.”). Belief in one’s
objectivity is not confined to law students. In fact, most people generally feel that their perceptions, judgments, and opinions are objective. Pronin & Schmidt, supra note 117, at 200.
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as an individual problem and ignore its institutional manifestations, and the fact
that, as a society, we bear a collective responsibility to remedy the effects of
that bias.133 Also, learning that unconscious biases are a result of our socialization runs the risk of normalizing bias and encouraging a “my culture made me
do it” approach to dealing with issues in which biases surface.134 Exposure to
social cognition theory also has the potential to increase, rather than decrease,
some students’ resistance to multicultural education. The path to developing
multicultural perspectives and understandings requires engaging in critical
thinking about our cultural identities, power, and privilege.135 It challenges
people to engage in self-exploration about their own biases and prejudices.136
This self-exploration can engender anxiety and resistance because it threatens
one’s sense of oneself and one’s place in society.137
Many educators argue that developing students’ cross-cultural lawyering
skills requires engaging students in a critical examination of how race, ethnicity, sexual identity, socio-economic class, and other cultural factors have influenced the law and legal systems in ways that have disempowered nonEuropean groups.138 For some students, this means they must re-examine their
world views about merit and justice.139 Students may grapple with information
that challenges their beliefs in meritocracy, social justice, and that they exist
separate from, and uninfluenced by, the society around them.140 Discussion of

133

Professor Lawrence warns that normalizing bias can lead to denial of both individual and
collective responsibility for ongoing behavior that “creates and perpetuates racial hierarchy”
and which results in continued discrimination and inequality. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6, at 960–65.
134
Eric Luis Uhlmann & Brian A. Nosek, My Culture Made Me Do It: Lay Theories of Responsibility for Automatic Prejudice, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (2012) (finding study participants often attributed their subconscious racial biases to their culture rather than accepting
personal responsibility for their thoughts and actions).
135
Kathleen Holtz Deal & Cheryl A. Hyde, Understanding MSW Student Anxiety and Resistance to Multicultural Learning: A Developmental Perspective, 24 J. TEACHING SOC.
WORK 73, 74 (2004).
136
Jessica Jean Kastner, Beyond the Bench: Solutions to Reduce the Disproportionate Number of Minority Youth in the Family and Criminal Court Systems, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 941, 947
(2007) (citing numerous scholars who argue that multicultural competence requires acknowledging the existence of racism and white privilege which means confronting uncomfortable truths about ourselves and our society, especially for those of us who have enjoyed
the privileges accorded to the dominant culture).
137
Deal & Hyde, supra note 135.
138
Archer, supra note 6, at 70 (arguing that teaching students about cultural differences is
insufficient and that teachers must be willing to challenge students’ “post-racial beliefs and
the way in which these beliefs help to perpetuate racism, inequality, and white-privilege”);
Kastner, supra note 136 (noting that numerous educators believe that multicultural competency education requires discussion of racism and white privilege).
139
Connie S. Chan & Mary Jane Treacy, Resistance in Multicultural Courses: Student,
Faculty, and Classroom Dynamics, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 212, 213 (1996).
140
Id. at 214; see also Beverly Daniel Tatum, Talking About Race, Learning About Racism:
The Application of Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom, 62 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 1, 6 (1992) (“An understanding of racism as a system of advantage presents a serious
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issues involving oppression such as racism, classism, gender bias, ageism, antiSemitism, etc. often “generates powerful emotional responses in students that
range from guilt and shame to anger and despair.”141 However, it is exploration
of issues relating to race and ethnicity that tend to provoke the greatest resistance, particularly amongst white students.142 It is challenging to raise issues
of personal and structural bias and racism143 because the prevalent and dominant discourse asserts that racism is a thing of the past and we now live in a
“color-blind” society.144
In a recent training about unconscious biases, one white man, after taking
the IAT, was both aghast and disbelieving of the results. “How can this be?” he
asked. “I have worked for [Congressman] John Lewis145 for the past ten
years.”146 His response to the IAT results is not surprising or unexpected.
Learning that one harbors unconscious biases can create a high level of discomfort when it conflicts with one’s belief that one operates from an unbiased,
egalitarian viewpoint. The conflict between conscious thought processes and
unconscious preferences can result in dissociation—“the occurrence, in one and
challenge to the notion of the United States as a just society where rewards are based solely
on one’s merit.”).
141
Tatum, supra note 140, at 1–2.
142
Bridget Turner Kelly & Joy Gaston Gayles, Resistance to Racial/Ethnic Dialog in Graduate Preparation Programs: Implications for Developing Multicultural Competence, 29 C.
STUDENT AFF. J. 75, 79 (2010) (noting that in a study of graduate student preparation programs “[a]cross race, ethnicity, gender, and preparation programs, participants reported experiencing resistance to discussing multicultural issues, primarily related to race/ethnicity”).
See generally Tatum, supra note 140 (discussing resistance to learning about racism).
143

Structural racism is a complex, dynamic system of conferring social benefits on some
groups and imposing burdens on others that results in segregation, poverty, and denial of opportunity for millions of people of color. It comprises cultural beliefs, historical legacies, and institutional policies within and among public and private organizations that interweave to create
drastic racial disparities in life outcomes.

William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction, 100
KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2011–12).
144
See generally Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 6 (discussing how
the Supreme Court, and society in general, seeks to deny that race is a continuing factor in
the institutional and structural inequalities that exist in the United States today); see also
Archer, supra note 6, at 64–68 (discussing her law school clinic students’ belief that we live
in a “post-racial” society which resulted in a reluctance to acknowledge the role racial discrimination played in the inequalities their clients experienced); Curcio et al., Survey Instrument, supra note 4, at app. D at 242 (indicating that most white students did not believe that
experiences stemming from their racial or ethnic identities influenced their views of the U.S.
legal system); Kelly & Gayles, supra note 142, at 77 (relaying a study finding that “students
of color” reported thinking about their racial/ethnic background daily, whereas the white
students reported that they thought of this “relatively infrequently”); Jean Koh Peters & Susan Bryant, Talking About Race, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 375, 380 (Susan Bryant et al. eds., 2014)
(noting that some may believe that acknowledging difference or bias violates a commitment
to equality, e.g. “I do not see black people, I just see people.”).
145
Congressman Lewis is an African-American congressman who is one of this country’s
most ardent civil rights and racial equality advocates.
146
Conversation with Dr. Kimberly Jones, Decatur High School Counselor, (May 2014).
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the same mind, of mutually inconsistent ideas that remain isolated from one
another.”147 Discovery of one’s dissociative thoughts via IATs may produce
cognitive dissonance—an uncomfortable mental state in which we become
aware of conflicts between our beliefs and our actions or two simultaneously
coexisting beliefs, a conflict which interferes with our desire for mental harmony.148 Because social cognition theory about subconscious biases may force
students to confront unpleasant realities, exposure to it may trigger resistance to
cross-cultural education efforts.149
Student resistance, while not the only barrier to effective multicultural
teaching,150 presents a significant barrier to learning. Student resistance manifests in various ways. In some cases, students resist uncomfortable material via
overt challenges to the material and/or professor. “Claims of course bias, reverse ‘victimization,’ and the ‘right’ to be provocative (e.g., make racist or sexist comments) are strategies to distance oneself from what is perceived as ‘dangerous’ material.”151 Students may challenge the accuracy of data and critique
autobiographical accounts based upon their subjectivity.152 At the other end of
the spectrum, students may passively resist learning via silence153 or attempting
to shift the conversation to a “class not race” dialogue.154
On one level, law professors should welcome resistance. Student questions
and challenges indicate engagement with provocative material155—exactly the
kind of learning atmosphere we hope to produce in our law classes. “[D]eep
cognitive shifts that reflect knowledge integration” require learners to resist

147

BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 57–58.
Id. at 59; Elisabeth L. McFalls & Deirdre Cobb-Roberts, Reducing Resistance to Diversity Through Cognitive Dissonance Instruction: Implications for Teacher Education, 52 J.
TEACHER EDUC. 164, 165 (2001) (discussing the dissonance that occurs when students in
multicultural education courses are exposed to information inconsistent with their prior beliefs and experiences).
149
BANAJI & GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT, supra note 78, at 59–60 (noting that people may be
uncomfortable coming to terms with the IAT results, but finding that most people they encountered would rather know about their unconscious assumptions).
150
For a discussion of additional barriers to multicultural teaching, see Khadija Khaja et al.,
Multicultural Teaching: Barriers and Recommendations, 21 J. ON EXCELLENCE C. TEACHING
5 (2010) (discussing results of university wide survey asking 464 faculty members across
disciplines about perceived barriers to multicultural teaching); see also Okianer Christian
Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into
Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541, 557–60 (1996) (discussing challenges
law faculty may confront when addressing diversity issues within the classroom).
151
Deal & Hyde, supra note 135, at 75.
152
Tatum, supra note 140, at 6.
153
Deal & Hyde, supra note 135, at 76; Aja E. LaDuke, Resistance and Renegotiation: Preservice Teacher Interactions with and Reactions to Multicultural Education Course Content,
MULTICULTURAL EDUC., Spring 2009, at 37, 39.
154
LaDuke, supra note 153, at 40–41 (providing an example of how during discussions of
white privilege as it relates to access to higher education students sought “to move analysis
away from race, often on to issues of class and socioeconomic status.”).
155
Chan & Treacy, supra note 139, at 214.
148
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learning and their teachers to engage that resistance.156 That said, resistance can
be a disruptive force.157 The following section briefly discusses how to address
student resistance as well as other pedagogical issues.
IV. SOCIAL COGNITION THEORY AND LAW SCHOOL
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION PEDAGOGY
A. Dealing with Student Resistance
Many have written lengthy and thoughtful articles about the causes of student resistance to multicultural learning, and potential remedies thereto.158
While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide an in-depth review of
suggestions for overcoming student resistance to diversity education, some
common themes emerge. For example, teachers are encouraged to focus on the
value of learning about how the most effective lawyers understand the role culture, and our own cultural biases, play in the lawyering process.159 To the extent students understand how biases affect one’s ability to represent clients and
succeed in the workplace,160 they may be more open to exploring those bias156

Jessica Berit Kindred, “8/18/97 Bite Me”: Resistance in Learning and Work, 6 MIND
CULTURE & ACTIVITY 196, 198–99 (1999); see also Helen A. Moore, Student Resistance in
Sociology Classrooms: Tools for Learning and Teaching, SOC. VIEWPOINTS, Fall 2007, at 29,
38–39.
157
Barbara Applebaum, Engaging Student Disengagement: Resistance or Disagreement?,
2007 PHIL. EDUC. Y.B. 335, 337–39 (discussing the alienating effect on students of color
when white students refuse to acknowledge social facts that are at odds with those students’
experiences).
158
E.g., id. (identifying ways privileged students may resist learning and suggesting that
students be told they do not need to adopt a particular viewpoint but do need to engage with
course material that challenges their notions of themselves and society); Archer, supra note 6
(discussing challenges of teaching students who believe we live in a “post-racial” society
and suggesting that in addition to raising cultural issues in context of client representation,
students should be “immersed” in the history, social science and context of racial discrimination); Dark, supra note 150 (discussing why it is important to raise diversity issues in law
school classes and how to create a supportive and open classroom environment that makes it
easier to do so); McFalls & Cobb-Roberts, supra note 148 (suggesting that resistance can be
lowered by exposing students to cognitive dissonance theory); Peters & Bryant, supra note
144 (discussing why students are resistant to talking about race and ways to work through
that resistance); Tatum, supra note 140 (identifying sources of student resistance to talking
about race and learning about racism and some strategies to overcome the resistance).
159
Bryant, supra note 127, at 81 (discussing how when we help students understand the significance of cultural similarities and differences and help them see how that understanding is
critical to good lawyering, we lower student resistance to learning about the role their own,
and others’ culture plays in the lawyering process); Dark, supra note 150, at 569 (emphasizing the need to connect diversity discussions with “legal theory, doctrine or practice.”); Khaja, supra note 150, at 22 (suggesting that focusing on the value of learning and applying diverse viewpoints helps lower student resistance to multicultural learning).
160
See supra Part II.D (discussing how unconscious biases affect legal representation and
legal workplaces). For an in-depth discussion of how implicit biases help explain the lack of
diversity in large law firms, especially at the partner level, see generally Negowetti, supra
note 85.
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es.161 Professors Peters and Bryant suggest that law teachers regularly ask the
question: “what role does race play in our work” both to monitor individual biases and stereotypes and to raise consciousness about the role race plays in the
development and application of legal rules and legal systems.162 Teachers also
should create an atmosphere of open discussion and inquiry in which all students understand that the professor is not asking them to endorse a particular
viewpoint, but is asking them to be open to, and respectful of, different experiences and viewpoints.163 Teachers also must become active listeners—
observing body language and listening to what is said and what is unsaid by
both the speaker and the non-speakers—in order to address what is left unsaid.164 It has even been suggested that because people often experience cognitive dissonance when they learn that their internal biases do not coincide with
their conscious thought processes students should be exposed to the psychological literature about cognitive dissonance.165 As teachers, we also likely will be
more adept at understanding student resistance if we acknowledge our own biases and honestly grapple with the surprise and discomfort that causes us.166
161

While cultural self-awareness is a key component of culturally sensible lawyering, to be
effective cross-cultural lawyers, students must also understand “the nature of racism and the
impact that racial differences have on daily life.” Archer, supra note 6, at 69. Professor
Archer suggests this understanding can be developed through deliberately teaching students
“about the history, social science, and context of racial discrimination, themes that are foreign to many of them.” Id. at 72.
162
Peters & Bryant, supra note 144, at 383. They also note that paying explicit attention to
race is a way to counteract unconscious bias. Id. at 383–84.
163
Chan & Treacy, supra note 139, at 217 (suggesting that if students understand that what
counts is engagement with the material but not necessarily agreement with it, students will
be less resistant); Dark, supra note 150, at 565–66 (arguing that law professors should consistently encourage participation from all students during class discussions); Peters & Bryant, supra note 144, at 381 (noting “that teachers must build an atmosphere of trust in which
participants understand that they are learning together, and learning involves making mistakes and providing each other honest feedback about those mistakes”); Tatum, supra note
140, at 18 (noting that the first step in creating a safe space for all students to speak requires
“[e]stablishing the guidelines of confidentiality, mutual respect, ‘no zaps,’ and speaking
from one’s own experience on the first day of class”). But see Applebaum, supra note 157
(identifying the importance of not allowing class to be dominated by those who discount data
about racism and racial injustice because when that happens, it further marginalizes already
marginalized students); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally
Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 174 (2004) (noting that “[w]hile some students might consider a
safe environment to be one in which people ‘do not get angry,’ or ‘raise their voices,’ others,
particularly students of color, ‘may view this as an effort to squelch their expression of the
angering experiences with racism that they have lived through and want to talk about’ ”).
164
Dark, supra note 150, at 569–70.
165
See generally McFalls & Cobb-Roberts, supra note 148 (discussing their study which
indicates that exposure to cognitive dissonance literature helped some students understand
their reactions to information that was inconsistent with their beliefs, opinion and experiences and thus lowered their resistance to learning about diversity issues).
166
See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219, 244 (2002) (noting that intercultural competency training only succeeds if “those of us who train lawyers confront our own humanity, our own racial demons,
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Whatever instructional techniques are used, the key is to understand, and be
prepared for, resistance, even amongst those who express a desire to learn
about the role culture plays in the legal system.
B. Introducing Social Cognition Theory During Orientation
While not totally without risk, adding social cognition theory to multicultural teaching provides perspective and a way for students to understand bias
and its impact on lawyering. Exposure to social cognition theories such as aversive racism,167 implicit bias as evidenced by the Implicit Association Tests,168
bias blind spot,169 and confirmation bias170 can help students understand the
pervasiveness of bias, even in well-meaning people. Exposure to studies of how
these biases manifest in legal practice171 help students understand the relevance
of learning about the role culture plays in the lawyering process. It also teaches
them that their analytical training does not protect them from having, and acting upon, subconscious biases.172
Given the importance of developing lawyers equipped to work in today’s
multicultural world, I suggest exposing students to social cognition theory as it
relates to subconscious biases and their implication for lawyering during law
school orientation, or shortly thereafter. To help students understand how implicit biases both affect them as future lawyers, and play a role in the legal system, students could be assigned selected reading about the impact of various
subconscious biases on interactions and legal decision making.173 Students also
should be made aware of the dangers of “bias blind spot” in order to improve
their self-reflective abilities.174 Framing this education as an important compouncomfortable and messy as that may be”); Tatum, supra note 140, at 18 (suggesting that
teachers speak from their own experiences); see also Seth Donal Hannah & Elizabeth Carpenter-Song, Patrolling Your Blind Spots: Introspection and Public Catharsis in a Medical
School Faculty Development Course to Reduce Unconscious Bias in Medicine, 37 CULTURE
MED. & PSYCHIATRY 314 (2013) (recognizing that to be effective teachers, faculty must explore their own biases and discussing a medical school faculty development course designed
to raise faculty’s awareness of their own subconscious biases).
167
See supra Part II.B.
168
See supra Part II.C.
169
See supra Part III.A.
170
See supra Part III.A.
171
See supra Part II.D.2.
172
See supra Part III.B.
173
For example, Professor Banaji and Greenwald’s book provides a quick, digestible and
comprehensive explanation of implicit bias, its manifestations in the justice system, and
strategies for avoiding unintended discriminatory conduct. BANAJI & GREENWALD,
BLINDSPOT, supra note 78.
174
See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing how exposure to studies about unconscious biases eliminated the bias blind spot effect). Of course, exposure during orientation to
social cognition theory is unlikely to result in a long-term change in students’ decisionmaking processes. Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393 (noting that some argue that instruction alone cannot combat subconscious biases); Kang, supra note 129, at 1528–35 (suggesting that it is difficult or even impossible, to eliminate completely the effects of implicit
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nent of effective lawyering175 explains both why it is a part of their law school
orientation, and potentially lessens student resistance to what, for many of
them, may be new and challenging concepts.176
Assigning reading that exposes students to social cognition literature as it
relates to biases during orientation sends the message that “thinking like a lawyer” means considering the role cultural biases have played, and continue to
play, in legal representation. Introducing the topic in orientation helps set the
stage for ongoing discussions in a wide range of law school courses, and it increases students’ awareness that lawyers, just like clients, are influenced by
their cultural biases and stereotypes.
C. Teaching Techniques Based upon Social Cognition Theory Studies
Once the stage is set during orientation, faculty may raise issues of both
explicit and implicit bias in the ways that are best suited to the class and the
professor’s teaching style. While it is outside the scope of this article to engage
in an in-depth exploration of ways to raise students’ awareness of both implicit
and explicit racial and other cultural biases in judicial decision making as well
as their own analyses, the following are just a few of the multiple opportunities
to raise these issues throughout the curriculum.177 In civil procedure, the seminal case of Iqbal v. Ashcroft178 can be used to introduce students to the role implicit biases based upon racial and ethnic stereotypes may have on judicial decision-making.179 Later in the course, showing the video in Scott v. Harris180

bias). But see Rachlinski et al., supra note 95 at 1221 (finding that judges’ conscious awareness of implicit racial bias helped change their decision-making processes).
175
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing how cultural biases impact lawyering) and Part II.D.2
(discussing how biases impact employer evaluations).
176
See supra Part IV.A.
177
For an example of how to integrate cultural sensibility education into doctrinal courses,
see ANTHONY O’DONNELL & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, DEVELOPING A CROSS-CULTURAL LAW
CURRICULUM (1997) (suggesting numerous ways to integrate discussions of the influence
culture has on legal analysis and decision making in torts, property and equity courses). For
additional suggestions, see Mary A. Lynch et al., Teaching the Newly Essential Knowledge,
Skills, and Values in a Changing World, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (Deborah Maranville et al. eds.) (forthcoming
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2558863. For a discussion of how to talk about race in a law school classroom, see generally Margalynne J.
Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming
Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635 (2008); Frank René Lopéz, Pedagogy
on Teaching Race & Law: Beyond “Talk Show” Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 39
(2004); Peters & Bryant, supra note 144.
178
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
179
See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Critical Race Empiricism: A New Means to Measure
Civil Procedure, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 187 (2013) (discussing a study that demonstrates in
the post-Iqbal shift from notice pleading to a subjective plausibility pleading standard, the
dismissal rates of black plaintiff’s claims has increased and there is a difference in pleading
dismissals between white and black judges—a difference the author postulates may be attributable to implicit racial bias).
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and discussing why a young black man may be fleeing from the police in a situation in which white students would have likely pulled over presents another
opportunity to discuss how rational decisions, and assessments of those decisions, may be related to one’s cultural experiences. In family law, students can
be asked to explore how cultural factors inform the development and analysis
of the factors used to determine whether something is in the best interests of the
child in all types of child placement decisions.181 In criminal law, understanding the history of how the American government took American Indian children away from their parents and placed them in institutions may help students
understand why an American Indian mother did not bring her sick child to a
government hospital.182 Clinical experiences also provide ripe ground for educating students about the role culture plays in the lawyer/client relationship and
legal decision-making process.183 Legal writing classes are also a place where
students can be taught to analyze the role culture and bias plays in legal analysis.184
180

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). In Scott v. Harris, the police attempted to pull over
Mr. Harris, a young African American man who was speeding. Mr. Harris, who was driving
on a suspended license, decided not to stop because he was afraid of going to jail. Mr. Harris
initiated a high-speed car chase. To end the chase, Deputy Scott rammed Harris’s car with
the police cruiser. Harris crashed. As a result of the crash, Harris became a quadriplegic.
Harris sued Scott alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity—a claim the Supreme Court upheld. A video in which both Mr. Harris and Deputy Scott discuss what happened is available at vik2k3,
Why I Ran., YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JATVLUOjzvM.
181
Professor Tanya Washington, a colleague at Georgia State University College of Law,
uses this idea in her family law class. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see generally
Cynthia R. Mabry, The Browning of America—Multicultural and Bicultural Families in
Conflict: Making Culture a Customary Factor for Consideration in Child Custody Disputes,
16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 413 (2010).
182
Professor Nirej Sekhon, a colleague who teaches criminal law, engages his first year
criminal law students in this discussion based upon the case of State v. Williams, 484 P.2d
1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). For a discussion of that case and the cultural underpinnings of
the parents’ decision, see Megan H. Dearth, Comment, Defending the “Indefensible”: Replacing Ethnocentrism with a Native American Cultural Defense, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
621, 639–40 (2011).
183
Numerous clinical legal educators have discussed both the importance of educating their
students about the role culture plays in the lawyering process and methods to do that. For a
discussion of methodologies useful in teaching clinic students about the role culture plays in
the lawyering process, see generally Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the
Habits: Teaching about Identity, Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE
EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note
144. For additional thoughts on teaching clinic students, see Lisa Bliss et al., Client and Patient Relationships: Understanding Cultural and Social Context, in POVERTY, HEALTH AND
LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 125, 147 (Elizabeth Tobin
Tyler et al. eds., 2011); López, supra note 127; see also Archer, supra note 6, (discussing the
importance of facilitating clinic students’ understanding of the existence and implications of
racism as well as other cultural factors in order to best equip students to represent effectively
their clients).
184
See, e.g., Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)examined Assumptions and
(Un)intended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Johanna K.P. Dennis, Ensuring a Multicultural Ed-
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Raising awareness of various cultural perspectives involved in legal decision making is actually a “de-biasing” technique. One study found that perspective taking (i.e. looking at the problem from someone else’s perspective) diminished the use of outgroup stereotypes.185 Another “de-biasing” teaching methmethodology involves asking students to “consider the opposite” and think
about rival viewpoints or counterfactual outcomes. This teaching strategy also
has been somewhat effective in countering confirmation and related biases.186
“Perspective taking” and “consider the opposite” are teaching methodologies
already familiar to many law professors. Providing students with a grounding in
social cognition theory and using these familiar teaching methodologies across
the curriculum hopefully will enhance students’ abilities to identify when their
own, and others’, cultural and racial experiences, perspectives, and attitudes
may influence factual or legal analyses, decisions about culpability, and decisions about the most appropriate course of conduct.187
CONCLUSION
The survey data suggest that law students, like others, are subject to “bias
blind spot,” both on a personal level and in their conceptions about lawyers.
Students believe that they approach legal problems relatively bias-free, and that
lawyers are less likely than clients to be affected by their cultural experiences
and biases. As the social cognition studies discussed above indicate, it is unlikely students accurately assess either their own, or lawyers’, susceptibility to
subconscious biases. To remedy this deficiency, social cognition theory about
unconscious biases should be amongst the many facets of cultural sensibility
education, and this education should begin during orientation. Understanding
subconscious biases, their pervasiveness, and their impact on perceptions, interactions, and analyses, helps prepare lawyers to represent people from cultural and racial backgrounds different from their own, and to address both individual and institutional injustice.
ucational Experience in Legal Education: Start with the Legal Writing Classroom, 16 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 613 (2010).
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See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393 (2009). Outgroup stereotypes are those stereotypes we attribute to people who do not belong to one of our socially constructed groups.
Marcia L. McCormick, The Equality Paradise: Paradoxes of the Law’s Power to Advance
Equality, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 515, 538–39 (2007) (“[I]ndividuals see members of
their own group (the ingroup) as more like themselves, and others (the outgroup) as more
different from themselves than they would without the group identity. People in a group are
also much less able to see differences among members of the outgroup.” (footnote omitted)).
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See Lilienfeld et al., supra note 102, at 393. Some studies suggest that health care clinicians who took the time to consider alternative viewpoints and perspectives were less likely
to make decisions based upon confirmation bias. Id. The same finding is likely to be true for
lawyers and law clinic students.
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Archer, supra note 6, at 69–70 (noting that a cross-cultural lawyer must acknowledge
how her own “attitude about race and racism may impact her interactions with her client, her
examination of the legal and factual issues presented in the case, the course of action selected, and the attribution of blame”).

